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If dissenters are to be permitted to intervene at the outset of a receiver-
ship proceeding and to object to specific orders as soon as they are made,
there can be no doubt as to the adequacy of their remedies within the reor-
ganization itself. Intervention at the start will militate against any such
cavalier disposition of minority rights as frequently characterizes the pre-
vailing equity procedure. The management group will be checked at every
turn, for dissenters will be able to contest and obtain a hearing upon the
particular receiver appointed, the representation of creditors, the conduct
of the proceeding in general, the amount of the upset price, and the pro-
visions of the plan - all before judicial inertia will have rendered any pro-
test in vain. The result. of this liberalization of the intervention requirements
will be to secure to interested parties the right to participate in the forma-
tion of a plan, a particularly valuable right since it affords the only method
whereby creditors can insure themselves an adequate participation in the
reorganized corporation. Nor is the right to object to specific orders an
abstract privilege devoid of any practical value. For instance, the objector
may contest the upset price on the theory that the evaluation of corporate
assets is entirely too low, and even though his plea is not accepted in the
trial court, the reviewing tribunal may send the case back for a re-evalua-
tion and resultant increase in pro rata participation for all creditors con-
cerned. Indeed, the very fact that the corporation is presumably to continue
as a going concern will enable its creditors to obtain a greater realization
on outstanding claims than could ordinarily be had in bankruptcy or other
forced liquidation of the company.
APPEALABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
LEGISLATIVE attempts to inhibit judicial control over administrative action
have been directed principally at endowing administrative findings with a
greater measure of finality ;' but the possibility of completely insulating some
types of orders from judicial scrutiny has for the most part been ignored.
While draftsmen have generally made no conscious effort to avail themselves
of this device, in certain situations courts have refused to allow an appeal to
be taken, even from orders clearly reversible under the applicable formula
for review. It is the purpose of this Comment to examine the characteristics
of "appealable orders" with a view toward determining the desirability and
1. Most of the controversy in the field of administrative law has centered around
the scope of review. See Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts (1938) 47 YALE
L. J. 519; Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion (1938) 47 YALE
L. J. 577, 588 et seq.; Davison, Administrative and Judicial Self-Limitation (1936) 4
Go. WASH. L. REv. 291.
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feasibility of more painstaking statutory delineation of the orders from which
appeals may be prosecuted.
2
The evolution of the rules governing appealability has of course been con-
ditioned to some extent by the available methods of attacking administrative
orders. Congress has provided two broad procedures: the statutory injunc-
tion and the direct appeal. Typical of the first method is the provision vesting
the United States district courts with jurisdiction "to enjoin, annul, set aside
or suspend in whole or in part any order of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission." 3 The second type of review is more in the nature of an appeal from
a lower court. Statutes in which it is incorporated usually provide that a
direct appeal may be taken to the appropriate United States circuit court of
appeals by filing a transcript of the record of the administrative proceeding.
This procedure has been increasingly employed in recent years, and it is at
present applicable to the decisions of the Federal Trade Commission,4 the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the National Labor Relations
Board.6 But these statutory provisions have had a limited, and at best hap-
hazard, effect on appealability, for when the statutory remedy is either non-
existent or inadequate, courts have often issued general equity injunctions
or extraordinary process against the individual administrators And in cer-
tain cases, the person to whom an order is directed may obtain a review by
refusing to obey, for the administrative agency will then be forced to resort
2. The discussion is confined almost exclusively to orders of the independent fed-
eral administrative agencies.
3. This jurisdiction wvas first conferred upon the Commerce Court by the Commerce
Court Act [36 STAT. 539 (1910)], and, upon the abolition of that court, was transferred
to the district courts. 38 STAT. 219 (1913), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (28) (1934) ; see 2 S1AnF-
MAx, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1931) 389. For a compilation of the
administrative agencies whose decisions are subject to a similar review by statutory
injunction, see Alexander, Statutory Injunctions Under the Federal Alcohol Adninistra-
tion Act (1937) 6 BROOLYN L. REv. 302, 304. Compensation orders under the Long-
shoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensation Act are subjected to mandatory as well
as prohibitive injunctions. 44 STAT. 1436 (1927). 33 U. S. C. 921 (b) (1934).
4. 38 STAT. 720 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §45 (1934).
5. 48 STAT. 80 (1933), 15 U. S. C. §77 i (a) (1934); 48 STT. 901, 15 V. S. C.
§78 y (a) (1934); 49 STAT. 834 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. §79x (a) (Supp. 1937). See
note 86, infra.
6. 49 STAT. 455 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160 (f) (Supp. 1937). Other agencies
with statutes providing for a similar appeal include the Federal Power Commission, the
Bituminous Coal Commission. the Communications Commission under its radio licens-
ing function, the Secretary of Agriculture in respect to his regulation of unlawful prac-
tice among packers, and the Federal Reserve Board and the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission in connection with their regulatory duties under the Clayton Act. See Alexander,
supra note 3, at 315.
7. See Louisville & Nash. R. R. v. Garrett. 231 U. S. 293, 310-311 (1913) ; BLAcnLY
AND OATMAN, AD2INISTRATIVE LEolsLATION AND ADjUDICATIO: (1934) 185 ct seq.;
Alpert, Suits Against Administrative Agencies under Ar. I. R. A. and A. A. A. (1935)
12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 393: Caldwell, Appeals from Decisions of the Federal Radio
Commission (1930) 1 J. Am L. 274, 318, n. 154.
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to the courts for enforcement;8 but, if this procedure is adopted, the recal-
citrant frequently exposes himself to penalties.9
Since the statutory provisions normally indicate inconclusively the kind
of orders which may be appealed, 10 courts have been able to exert an almost
completely unfettered discretion in placing limitations on appealability. The
nature of the criteria that have been developed is as diverse as the adminis-
trative process; collectively they represent an amalgam of restrictions appro-
priate to the judicial, legislative and executive aspects of administrative action.
Thus the rule that appeals may be taken only from the final orders of a court
has its counterpart in administrative adjudications. But, unlike the typical
court action, the informal multiple-party administrative proceeding affects
divergent groups, and restrictions have been developed to define those whose
interest is sufficient to prosecute appeals from administrative orders.11 While
these doctrines are adapted to administrative orders which can be likened to
judicial decisions, the rules and regulations promulgated by administrative
agencies bear a closer resemblance to statutes than to court decisions. Prob-
8. The orders of the Federal Trade Commission and the National Labor Relations
Board, for example, have no effect of themselves until affirmed and enforced by the ap-
propriate circuit court of appeals. See McFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION AND THrE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1933) 74-77, 179-
181; National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin S. Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 47 (1937).
And see notes 63, 70, infra, for cases where such a review was obtained. This method
of review, of course, is available only to those persons against whom the order is di-
rected. As to them, this procedure does not enlarge the scope of appealable orders, for
orders which need enforcement in the courts are almost always open to attack in direct
proceedings brought by the aggrieved party. But cf. notes 62, 63, 70, infra.
9. For examples of such penalty provisions, see § 16 of the Interstate Commerce
Act, 34 STAT. 590 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 16 (1934) ; § 5 of the Securities Act, 48 STAT.
77 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77(e) (1934). See generally Feller, Prospectus for the Fiur-
ther Study of Federal Administrative Law (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 647, 671-673.
10. The decisions of the Radio Commission from which an appeal could be taken,
however, were expressly enumerated in the statute. 44 STAT. 1169 (1927), as amended
in 46 STAT. 844 (1930). They included the denial of an application for a station license,
the denial of an application for a construction permit, and the denial of an application
for the renewal or modification of an existing station license. In the 1930 amendment,
the provision for appeal from a denial of a construction permit was inadvertently omitted.
Thereafter, the question of appealability under the statute turned upon whether an appli-
cation of a construction permit would be construed to fit into the other categories. Goss
v. Federal Radio Comm., 67 F. (2d) 507 (App. D. C. 1933); cf. Pote v. Federal Radio
Comm., 67 F. (2d) 509 (App. D. C. 1933). These provisions, with the provision for
appeal from a denial of a construction permit reinserted, have been substantially re-
enacted in respect to decisions of the Federal Communications Commission in its con-
trol over radio. 48 STAT. 1093, 47 U. S. C. § 402 (b) (1934). See Comment (1936)
49 HAv. L. Ray. 1333, 1341-1343. The effect of the varying statutory wordings is dis-
cussed p. 773, infra.
11. As in the case of attacks upon the constitutionality of statutes, the plaintiff must
first show that his rights are prejudicially affected or at least imminently threatened by
the administrative action. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288,
324 (1936); Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 649; Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 647.
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ably for this reason the doctrine that legislation may be attacked only in a case
or controversy has been imported into the field of administrative orders. Still
other restrictions on appealability are peculiarly apposite to the investigatory
or police activities of administrative agencies, for attempts may be made to
contest a refusal, after investigation, to institute regulatory proceedings.'
And superimposed upon the limitations peculiar to "legislative, judicial and
executive" orders are several doctrines applicable to orders that do not fit
into these neat but narrow categories.
I.
The restrictions on appealability may be divided into two groups: first,
those that define the stage at which administrative action may be challenged;
second, those that preclude attacks entirely. The theme that runs through
the first series of limitations is the necessity that an administrative determina-
tion be couched in the form of an unequivocal order, and that it threaten im-
minent injury.
This policy finds perhaps its principal expression in the doctrine that
general orders, rules, and regulations are not appealable directly, but can only
be attacked collaterally when a special order is entered applying them to a
particular individual' 3 or when some punitive action is about to be or has
been instituted for failure to comply.' 4 It is usually said that a general regu-
lation amounts to nothing more than public notice of an administrative in-
terpretation of statutory powers,' 5 or that it constitutes an exercise of a
quasi-legislative function and as such is subject only to the same types of
attack as a statute16 Whatever the doctrinal basis of the "case or controversy"
requirement, some limitation of this kind is necessary if administrative agencies
are not to be swamped by indiscriminate appeals.
Even when a direction is issued to a particular person, it can be appealed
only if it is framed in language that is peremptory enough to threaten im-
12. See FRumin, AD-mixmiSATrvn POWERS OVR PERs Ns ANm PnoPrTY (1923) 235.
Such a decision may be analogized to a refusal of a grand jury to prefer an indictment,
or of police or prosecuting officers to press charges.
13. Carrell v. Federal Radio Comm., 36 F. (2d) 117 (App. D. C. 1929); Nelson
v. State Board of Health, 186 Mass. 330, 71 N. E. 693 (1904); Standard Oil Co. v.
Board of Purification of Waters, 43 R. I. 336, 111 Ad. 887 (1921) ; see Caldwell, Appeals
From Decisions of the Federal Radio Commission (1930) 1 J. Ain L. 274, 299. But cf.
Brooklyn East. Dist. Terminal v. United States, 28 F. (2d) 634, 636 (S. D. N. Y.
1927). For an indication of the importance attached to the distinction bet een "orders"
and "rules and regulations" in connection with appealability, see 78 CoNGo. Rm- 2090-
8091 (1934).
14. Their enforcement may be enjoined. Cf. Kansas City So. Ry. v. United States,
231 U. S. 423 (1913) ; Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606 (1918).
15. See Interstate Comm. Comm. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 215 (1912);
United States v. Donahue Bros., 59 F. (2d) 1019, 1022 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
16. Standard Oil Co. v. Board of Purification of Waters, 43 R. I. 336, 111 At]. 837
(1921); cf. BLAcHLY AND OATMXAN, Op. cit. supra note 7, at 59.
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minent injury. In Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal v. United States T
the Interstate Commerce Commission entered a general order requiring inter-
state carriers to report their excess income and to pay one half of it to the
commission's secretary,18 but the Terminal did not comply in the belief that
it was not in the common carrier category. After a hearing, the commission
entered findings, made a report contrary to the Terminal's contention, but
issued no formal order; instead it simply "requested" payment. Since the
court felt that the "requests" were not orders at all, but only admonitions
that would not be followed by penalties, it refused to take jurisdiction over
a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the decision. Similarly, when a director
of the Securities and Exchange Commission informed a registrant by letter
that its petition for amendment of certain accounting requirements was denied,
the court, impressed by the informality of the whole transaction, denied appeal
on the ground that the director's letter was not an order of the commission.10
And a passage in a commission report notifying a carrier that it would be
expected to write its investment account down to a specified amount has not
been regarded as a mandate sufficient to form the basis of an appeal.
20
Though all the formality requirements are complied with, an appeal may
not be taken from an order that will have no immediate effect but will merely
form the basis of subsequent proceedings. Thus, in United States v. Los
Angeles Railroad Company,21 a final report on the valuation of a carrier's
property filed by the commission in accordance with the Valuation Act 22 was
held to be immune from .either a statutory or general equity injunction, even
though it was called an order, and even though the carrier alleged that the
commission had acted in excess of its powers and in violation of the consti-
tution. The court pointed out that this so-called order did not "command
the carrier to do or to refrain from doing anything . . . grant or with-
hold any liability, civil or criminal . . . change the carrier's existing or
future status or condition . . . determine any right or obligation," that
it was, in short, merely the formal record of conclusions reached after a
study of data collected in the exercise of the commission's function of in-
17. 28 F. (2d) 634 (S. D. N. Y. 1927).
18. The order was directed to all carriers who had accepted the provisions of Sec-
tion 209 of the Transportation Act [41 STAT. 464 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 77 (1934)],
in connection with their "recapture" from Federal control.
19. Third Avenue Ry. v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 85 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A.
2d. 1936) ; cf. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R. v. Peoria Ry., 270 U. S. 580 (1926) (telegram
explaining effect of previous orders); Ames Baldwin Wyoming Co. v. National Labor
Relations Bd., 73 F. (2d) 489 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
20. United States et al. v. Atlanta, B. & C. R. R., 282 U. S. 522 (1931), rv'a, 37
F. (2d) 401 (N. D. Ga. 1930). The report was viewed as an attempt by the commission
to secure the desired action without issuing a command. Id. at 527, 528. Cf. Great No.
Ry. v. United States, 277 U. S. 172 (1928).
21. 273 U. S. 299 (1927).
22. 37 STAT. 701 (1913), 49 U. S. C. § 19a (1934).
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vestigation.P And since the report was to have only prima facie effect 2 4 in
actions brought thereafter before the commission or before a court under
the Act to Regulate Commerce, it could be adequately contested subse-
quently.25 Similarly, orders of the I. C. C. which determine that a shipper
is entitled to damages by way of reparation for overcharges by a carrier
are not subject to attack by statutory injunction, for the carrier may
rebut the prima facie effect of those orders in the subsequent law action for
recovery of the damages thus awarded. 20 But while reparation orders will
generally be immediately followed by the shipper's legal proceedings, valua-
tion orders may not be put in issue in a subsequent action for many years,
and the carrier's credit may meanwhile be injured. In the Los Angeles Rail-
road case the court refused to heed this argument.2 7
The requirement that an order operate as a mandate has been applied to
deny appealability to some types of interlocutory orders. Thus, a document
termed an order which reopened, after three years, proceedings to value a
carrier's property was held not to be appealable by statutory injunction because
it was merely a direction that evidence be taken and not an affirmative
order.28 And assignment of a cause for further hearing upon an issue of
23. United States v. Los Angeles R. IL, 273 U. S. 299, 309-310 (1927). See, in
general, Tollefson, Judicial Review of the Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Com-
imssion (1937) 5 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 503. In Delaware & Hudson Co. v. United States,
266 U. S. 438 (1925), a bill to set aside a tentative valuation of the plaintiff's railroad
properties was dismissed because said valuation was "no more than an cx parte appraise-
ment without probative effect." An added factor in this case was the fact that protests,
as provided for by the statute, had been made to the commission and were to be consid-
ered before the valuation became final. See discussion of the requirement of exhaustion
of administrative remedies, p. 775, in!ra; cf. Brooklyn East. Dist. Terminal v. United
States, 28 F. (2d) 634, at 635 (S. D. N. Y. 1927). See also note 129, infra.
24. 37 STAT. 703 (1913), 49 U. S. C. § 19a (i) and (j) (1934).
25. United States v. Los Angeles R.R., 273 U. S. 299, at 312 (1927), construed
recently in United States v. Griffin, 58 Sup. Ct. 601, at 605 (1933). Thus, neither
the statutory nor the general equity injunction is available when there is any adequate
legal remedy. The contention that the commission might be misled by its own erroneous
valuation and subsequently apply it to the carrier's injury in making rates, in determining
the propriety of an issue of securities, or in fixing divisions of joint rates was also held
to present no grounds for general equity jurisdiction. But an order denying the carrier
permission to issue securities could probably not be attached in the courts. See note
133, infra.
26. Pittsburgh & XV. Va. Ry. v. United States, 6 r . (2d) 646 (NV. D. Pa. 1924);
Brady v. Interstate Comm. Comm., 43 F. (2d) 847 (N. D. AV. Va. 1930).
27. 273 U. S. 299, at 314 (1927). For a similar attitude, see Brooklyn East. Dist.
Terminal v. United States, 28 F. (2d) 634, 636 (S. D. N. Y. 1927). But ci. Norfolk &
XV. Ry. v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 967, 970 (IV. D. Va. 1931).
28. New York, 0. & IV. Ry. v. United States, 14 F. (2d) 850 (S. D. N. Y. 1926).
Jurisdiction was denied in spite of allegations of a complete lack of lawful power in the
commission to make the order attacked and in spite of the court's indications that the
allegations might be justified. Appeal might also have been denied on the ground that
even a final valuation is not an appealable order. See note 23, 4upra.
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reparation has been held to have no characteristics of an order but to be
simply notice of a hearing which the carrier might attend or not as it saw
fit.29 But an order of the Federal Power Commission directing the appellants
to appear for hearings has recently been held to be appealable because its
language was that of an order commanding definite action, and a refusal to
obey would therefore be followed by penalties.
30
Even when an interlocutory "order" is framed in peremptory terms, appeals
are usually denied on the basis of the general rule that appeals may be had
only from orders finally disposing of the proceedings.3 ' The roots of this
doctrine are in some respects similar to the policy behind the final judg-
ment rule in court proceedings :32 appellate courts realize that their energies
would be devoted largely to a consideration of trivial questions if appeals
were allowed from preliminary orders.33 More important, perhaps, is the
danger that promiscuous appeals from interlocutory rulings would gravely
interfere with administrative efficiency.
3 4
But the final order rule is not inflexible, for interlocutory and procedural
rulings of an administrative agency, like those of a court,35 may be made ap-
29. United States v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 244 U. S. 82 (1917) (petitioner claimed
commission lacked jurisdiction). The court might also have been refused to take juris-
diction on the grouid that, even if a decision were ultimately made contrary to the car-
rier's contentions, it would still have adequate remedy in its defense to the subsequent
damages action. See note 26, supra.
30. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Federal Power Comm., C. C. A. 3d, (1938) 5 U. S.
L. WEEK 645. See note 37, inlra. The order was issued in connection with an investi-
gation by the commission to supply a state utilities commission with certain requested
information. It was claimed that the federal commission had no power to conduct an
investigation for this purpose.
31. This rule may of course be used as an alternative ground for decision in cases
involving non-peremptory "orders."
32. See Crick, The Final Judgment Rule as a Basis for Appeal (1932) 41 YALE
L. J. 539.
33. See Citizens Passenger Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm., 271 Pa. 39, 52, 114 At. 642,
646-647 (1921); DIcKINSON, ADMINISTRATIvE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF TIlE
LAW (1927) 50; cf. Federal Trade Comm. v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160, 174
(1927).
34. New York, 0. & W. Ry. v. United States, 14 F. (2d) 850 (S. D. N. Y. 1926);
United States ex rel. Del. & H. R. R. v. Interstate Comm. Comm. (two cases), 51 F.
(2d) 429 (App. D. C. 1931) ; see Citizens Passenger Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm., 271 Pa.
39, 50, 114 At. 642, 646 (1921) ; Alexander, mpra note 3, at 323, n. 70 and cases cited.
It is said, in addition, that general principles of comity dictate that administrative
tribunals should have full opportunity to correct any errors in their proceeding before
their actions are subjected to judicial scrutiny. United States v. Illinois Cent. R. R.,
291 U. S. 457 (1934) ; United States ex rel. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Interstate Comm.
Comm., 279 Fed. 316 (App. D. C. 1922); WGN v. Federal Radio Comm., 68 F. (2d)
432 (App. D. C. 1933).
35. For cases in which interlocutory orders of administrative bodies were analogized
to those of courts, see note 38, infra.
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pealable by statute.36 In the absence of a specific provision permitting appeal
from interlocutory orders there is the possibility that general appeal pro-
visions will be construed to allow appeals from non-final orders.
37  While
appeals from interlocutory orders are clearly precluded when the statute de-
dares that appeals may be taken from final orders, a more difficult problem of
interpretation is presented under the typical provision for an appeal from "an
order of the Commission." 38 In Jones z. Securities and Exchange Commission o
it was held that "order" referred only to final determinations, namely, orders
refusing to permit registration statements to become effective and stop orders
suspending the effectiveness of such registration. ° A statutory appeal from
a denial by a trial examiner of a motion to withdraw a registration statement
was therefore not allowed. When appeal provisions are more specific, there
are even stronger grounds for refusing to permit interlocutory challenges.
For example, the provision in the statute allowing appeals from cease and
desist orders of the Federal Trade Commission has been held to exclude
an appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint.4 ' On similar
36. Apparently Congress may specifically make any administrative order appealable
to the courts. The cases in which statutory provisions for appeal to the Supreme Court
from administrative decisions have been declared unconstitutional are concerned with
the type of review rather than appealability. Thus, in Federal Radio Comm. v. General
Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 (1930), appeal was denied because the nature of the review
exercised by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals made it simply a superior, revis-
ing agency in the same branch of the government as the commission. When the act i, as
amended to make that court's function a judicial one, the Supreme Court granted cer-
torari. Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond and Mort. Co., 289 U. S. 265 (1933).
Cf. Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 59 F. (2d) 320 (C. C. A. 6th,
1932).
37. A provision that "no proceeding to review any order of the commission shall be
brought by any person unless such person shall have made application to the commission
for a rehearing thereon" has recently been interpreted to imply the right to a review
of any order, final or interlocutory, by which a person is aggrieved if he makes the
necessary application for rehearing. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Federal Power Comm.,
C. C. A. 3d, (1938) 5 U. S. L. Wunx 645.
38. Generally the phrases "an order" and "any order" have been interpreted as allor-
ing appeals only from final orders. The analogy that interlocutory orders of a court
are appealable only under special statutory provisions has frequently been resorted to.
Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Andrews' 88 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; In re
Deseret Mortuary Co., 78 Utah 393, 3 P. (2d) 267 (1931); see Citizens Passenger Ry.
v. Public Serv. Comm., 271 Pa. 39,47, 49, 114 Atl. 642, 645 (1921) ; cf. 5 PAuL. Ai M m.-
TENs, FmEAL IcomE TAXATION (1934) § 44.20. See, also, cases cited in Comment
(1935) 35 Cor- L. REv. 230, 240, n. 59, 60.
39. 79 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied 297 U. S. 705 (1936).
40. These were the only decisions of the Commission referred to as "orders" in the
1933 Act. But the denial of a request for confidential treatment of information filed
with this commission, although not referred to as an "order" in the 1934 act, has recently
been held to be an appealable order under the act. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp.
v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 93 F. (2d) 236 (App. D. C. 1937). See p. 780,
infra.
41. Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Comm., 280 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 8th,
1922); MacFadden Publications v. Federal Trade Comr., 37 F. (2d) 822 (App. D. C.
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grounds appeals from certification orders of the NLRB will probably be held
to be precluded by the provision that the certification of representatives and
the record of the investigation prior thereto are to be included in the transcript
of the entire record on appeal from an unfair labor practice order.
42
Though non-final orders are almost always immune from appeal, difficulties
may arise in determining what orders fit into the interlocutory category. In-
deed the same order may be final as to one party, and interlocutory as to
another. Thus an employer may not appeal from or enjoin certification of
bargaining agents by the New York State Labor Relations Board, for selec-
tion of representatives is regarded as a preliminary determination of fact
which cannot be challenged until an order is issued commanding an employer
to cease and desist from unfair labor practices. 43 At the same time it has
been indicated that, if the election were conducted only to settle a dispute as
to representation between rival unions, certification might be a final deter-
1930) ; see McFARLAND, op. cit. supra note 8, at 92-93; cf. Lea Mathew Shipping Corp.
v. United States Employees' Compensation Comm., 56 F. (2d) 860 (W. D. Wash, 1930)
(jurisdiction limited to "compensation orders"). See, also, note 10, supra. But cf. Hurst
& Son v. Federal Trade Comm., 268 Fed. 874, 878 (E. D. Va. 1920). Early review of the
Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction may be obtained, however, by defense to a suit
to enforce obedience to a subpoena. See note 70, infra.
42. § 9(d), 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 159(d) (Supp. 1937), Bendix
Products Corp. v. Beman, 14 F. Supp. 58, 66 (N. D. Ill. 1936). This claim finds sup-
port in the fact that the appeal provision of the Act comes in the section on unfair labor
practices and seems to refer only to cease and desist orders and to orders denying relief
from alleged unfair labor practices. § 10(f), 49 STAT. 455 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160
(f) (Supp. 1937). This argument is similar to the basis of the decision in the cases
cited note 41, mrpra. But see Joel v. Rosseter, 15 F. Supp. 914 (N. D. Cal. 1936) semble.
The Act is clearly designed to preclude any appeal from an order that an election be
held. Orders of the first National Labor Relations Board that an election be held by
secret ballot were formerly appealable under the statute. 48 STAT. 1183, 15 U. S. C.
§ 702b (1934), Guide Lamp Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 76 F. (2d) 370
(C. C. A. 7th, 1935). As a result, the board's actions were exposed to long delays pend-
ing the outcome of such appeals. See SENz. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 14;
Hearings before Senate Conintittee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935)
49-50.
43. it re Wallach's, Inc., N. Y. Sup. Ct., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 17, 1938, p. 252, col. 6,
aff'd, sub norn. Wallach's, Inc. v. Boland, 2 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 179 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1938). The court also held that an order that an election be held is not appealable. As
a further basis for its decision, the Appellate Division stated that the delay caused by
judicial review of the numerous intermediate steps in a controversy between employer
and employee would tend to defeat the statute's avowed purpose of encouraging col-
lective bargaining. The Court of Appeals has unanimously affirmed this decision. N. Y.
Times, March 19, 1938, p. 9, col. 6.
If the employer wished to appeal when no unfair labor practice proceeding was
being considered, he could refuse to bargain collectively with the certified representatives.
After the filing of a complaint by the certified unions, a cease and desist order would
be issued, and he might prosecute an appeal from that order. This is apparently also
true where the NLRB is involved. See Feller, supra note 9, at 671. See note 42, supra.
[Vol. 47: 766774
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
mination appealable by the defeated union.U4 In a pending suit it is being
urged that a similar differentiation should be made under the National Labor
Relations Act. 4 5
Despite the inclination of the courts to refuse to allow an appeal before
a final order has been issued, it may be possible to attack administrative
proceedings at an early stage by invocation of the general equity injunction.40
But in view of the long settled rule of judicial administration that adminis-
trative remedies must be exhausted before judicial relief will be granted,
4 T
such an attack will be successful only if the court is willing to find that resort
to the administrative body would be futile or that subjection of the peti-
tioner to the administrative process would work "irreparable injury."1s
Thus, while notice of a decision of the National Labor Relations Board to
hold a hearing on an unfair labor practice is not appealable,4 0 injunctions were
issued against such hearings by Federal district courts on no more substantial
allegations of irreparable injury than that the administrative investigation
would stir up feeling among the employees, would cause inconvenience by
taking them from their work, and would impair the good will of the em-
ployer 50 Especially in view of the provisions in the Act allowing an appeal
from final decisions to the circuit court of appeal and negating the juris-
diction of the district courts,51 these decisions were of doubtful validity. And
they have been disapproved by the recent Supreme Court holding in Myers
44. See Wallach's, Inc. v. Boland, 2 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 179, 181 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1938).
45. The case is now before the Third Circuit. N. Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1937, p. 14,
col. 4. Tfiough it seems clear that the employer cannot appeal, it is there being main-
tained that a losing union is entitled to appeal from a certification order. See notes
42 and 43, supra. The usual reason for appeals by employer or defeated union would
be to contest the propriety of the unit in which the election was held.
46. Extraordinary iemedies have also been employed as a device for circumventing
the final order rule in court proceedings. See Crick, supra note 32, at 554.
47. For general discussions of this rule, see Comment (1927) 27 CoL.. L Rv. 450;
Alpert, supra note 7, at 394 et seq. The rule is applicable both where the administrative
proceedings are in an interlocutory stage and where no such proceedings have been
begun. An example of the latter situation is the requirement that, before a shipper can
recover from a carrier for unreasonable and excessive freight rates exacted from him,
he must first apply to the L C. C. and have it decide whether the rates were in fact
unreasonable and excessive. See note 137, infra. See, in general, Miller, The Neces-
sity for Preliminary Resort to the Interstate Commerce Commission (1932) 1 Gro. WNAsA5.
L. REv. 49. In such a case the problem is strictly not one of appealability.
48. See Comment (1935) 35 CoL. L. RZV. 230, 233 et seq. Problems may arise also
in determining whether petitions for rehearing, or appeals to higher boards, or appeals
from a division to the entire board must be taken in order to "exhaust" administrative
remedies. Id. at 240-244. See, e.g., note 23 supra.
49. See notes 29 and 42, supra.
50. The cases are collected in Comment (1936) 46 YALE L J. 255, 261, n. 25. See in
general, Comment (1936) 4 Gri. ,VAsH. L Rxv. 391; Comment (1936) 22 WVAsu. U.
L. 1. Rxv. 81.
51. See note 6, supra.
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v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation 2 that the rule requiring exhaustion
of administrative remedies cannot be avoided by an allegation that the mere
holding of the hearing would work irreparable damage. 3 But some of the
earlier lower court decisions granted injunctions on the ground that the act
was unconstitutional,54 while the contention in the Myers case was that the
Board lacked jurisdiction. An argument may perhaps still be made there-
fore that the Myers case does not preclude an injunction where the consti-
tutionality of the whole act is in issue.3 5 It is difficult to see, however, how
the substantive grounds of the action affect the quantum of injury occasioned
by the holding of a hearing.56
While the Myers case will help to delineate the irreparable injury concept,
a preponderant area of uncertainty still remains s ' Since generalizations are
obviously futile, one illustration of the elasticity of the concept should suffice.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Company"8 the court re-
fused to enjoin -the enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum on the ground
that the corporate plaintiff had adequate opportunity to contest the validity
52. 58 Sup. Ct. 459 (Jan. 31, 1938).
53. The damage attendant upon such a hearing, as in the case of a groundless law-
suit, is regarded simply as one of the burdens of living under government. Cf. Chamber
of Comm. v. Federal Trade Comm., 280 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
54. Stout v. Pratt, 12 F. Supp. 864 (W. D. Mo. 1935), aff'd 85 F. (2d) 172 (C. C,
A. 8th, 1936) (temporary injunction); cf. Dartmouth Woolen Mills v. Myers, 15 F. Supp.
751 (D. N. H. 1936). This ground for injunctive relief was of course eliminated when
the Supreme Court declared the act constitutional. National Labor Relations Bd. v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1 (1937); see 1 Prentice-Hall Labor Serv.
115,117.
55. The language of the case may be treated as of such limited application: "So to
hold would . . . in effect substitute the District Court for the Board as the tribunal
to hear and determine what Congress declared the Board exclusively should hear and
determine in the first instance . . . That rule [exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement] has been repeatedly acted on in cases where, as here, the contention is
made that the administrative body lacked power over the subject matter." 58 Sup. Ct. at
463-464 (Jan. 31, 1938). The court uses language capable of a broader ihterpretation,
however, in its initial statement of the question for decision. Id. at 460.
56. Allowing such attacks when the constitutionality of the entire act is in question
would not be so serious a hindrance to administrative action, however, as when the at-
tacks are upon the administrative body's jurisdiction, or the constitutionality of a par-
ticular administrative action, for these latter questions may recur all during the agency's
life while constitutionality need be definitively settled only once. For a discussion of the
differentiation in treatment of these problems in connection with the exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies requirement, see Comment (1935) 35 CoL. L. Ray. 230, 234-236, 246,
n. 85; cf. (1931) 2 Am L. Rxv. 502, 503. Still an early attack in this fashion upon a
statute's validity may be undesirable because it calls for an abstract opinion rather than
one upon the statute in actual operation. White v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 367 (1931).
57. For a general discussion of irreparable injury in constitutional cases, see Com-
ment (1936) 46 YALx L. J. 255. For an example of what is considered injury sufficient
to avoid the exhaustion requirement, see Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U. S.
196 (1924).
58. 274 U. S. 160 (1927).
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of such an order by disobeying it and defending a mandamus suit brought
by the commission, even though it would thereby expose itself to civil lia-
bility of $100 per day by way of forfeiture beginning thirty days after notice
of default.59 In a later case, however, a temporary injunction against a similar
order was granted because disobedience would expose the individual plaintiffs
to the severer sanctions of criminal prosecution and possible fine and im-
prisonment.6 0
When it cannot plausibly be asserted that irreparable injury is threatened,
one device for contesting interlocutory orders remains. If the commission
finds it necessary to secure testimony or documents from a party whose con-
duct is being investigated, he may obtain a review by refusing to obey the
subpoena.61 The commission will then be forced to bring a mandamus action,
and the defendant may claim that the whole proceedings are beyond the powers
of the commission. Thus in the Jones case, the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari on the question of the appealability of the commission's refusal to allow
withdrawal of a registration statement, 2 but decided in favor of Jones in a
mandamus suit brought by the Commission to compel testimony in the regis-
tration proceeding.63 Similarly the NLRB may be constrained to subpoena
the books of an employer in order to determine whether he is engaged in
interstate commerce.6 4 Realizing that this practice would probably open the
gates to premature attacks on jurisdiction,66 the NLRB has resorted to the
device of subpoenaing the books of carriers to secure the necessary evidence;C
but satisfactory information can be obtained in this manner only in a lim-
59. The Claire Furnace decision was subsequently followed in a case where notice
of default had already been served. Federal Trade Comm. v. Maynard Coal Co., 22
F. (2d) 873 (App. D. C. 1927).
60. Federal Trade Comm. v. Millers! Nat. Federation, 23 F. (2d) 963 (App. D. C.
1927). For a suggestion that a similar argument might have been made in the Claire
Furnace case, see Handler, The Constitutionality of Imesligations by the Federal Trade
Commission: I (1928) 28 Cor- L. REv. 708, 714 et seq. Four years later a permanent
injunction was denied. Federal Trade Comm. v. Millers' Nat. Federation, 47 F. (2d) 428
(App. D. C. 1931). These cases, of course, are concerned with the question of when
legal remedies are adequate; but the problem of -when administrative remedies are ade-
quate is obviously similar.
61. In general, all orders which have to be enforced by the courts may be contested
by resisting the administrative agency's enforcement suits. See note 8, supra.
62. Jones v. Securities and -xchange Comm., 297 U. S. 705 (1936).
63. Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 298 U. S. 1 (1936), Comment (1936)
31 Irj. L. REv. 369, (1936) 4 Gao. VAsH. L. Ruv. 286.
64. See Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 84 F. (2d) 97, 100
(C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
65. Notice of a hearing is generally not an appealable order, even when lack of
jurisdiction is asserted. See notes 28, 29, supra. But cf. notes 30, 37, supra.
66. See Remington Rand, Inc. v. Lind, 16 F. Supp. 666, 670 (fV. D. N. Y. 1936)
(suit by employer to enjoin board proceedings; contention that this practice, by depriving
employer of opportunity to defend subpoena enforcement suit, made remedy at law in-
adequate).
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ited number of cases. Passive resistance as a method of securing review is
likely to be confined almost exclusively to agencies such as the SEC 7 and
the NLRB, since penalties for disobedience of their subpoenas do not attach
until the court orders compliance. 6 On the other hand, in the case of tri-
bunals such as the Federal Trade Commission, refusal to obey a subpoena
of itself subjects the contumacious witness to penalties, if the subpoena is
eventually upheld. 9 Nevertheless, recalcitrancy of this nature has been em-
ployed at an early stage of the proceedings as a method of challenging the




The rules thus far discussed merely delay attacks on administrative action;
equally important are the doctrines that outlaw appeals entirely. Limitations
of this sort may be divided into three broad categories: first, those applicable
to orders granting or denying a privilege to undertake a course of conduct,
second, those applicable to orders directing or refusing to direct the discon-
tinuance of a practice,71 and, third, those applicable to both these types of
orders.
Licensing Orders. Appeals may be taken from denials of a license or priv-
ilege, except in the rare instances when the licensing power of the admin-
istrative agency can be exercised with "unqualified," "free," or "pure" dis-
cretion.7 2 "Purely discretionary" is commonly contrasted with "quasi-judicial,"
but the antithesis is of small aid in giving content to this elusive concept.
Quasi-judicial action can only be defined as action which affects property
rights in a fashion sufficiently vital as to require notice and hearing, 7 "purely
discretionary" as that which may be taken without notice and hearing.
67. The Securities Act of 1933 provides no penalty for refusal to obey a subpoena
issued by the commission. But the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 do contain such a provision. Compare § 22(b),
48 STAT. 87 (1933), 15 U. S. C. §77v(b) (1934) with § 21(c), 48 STAT. 900, 15 U.S.C.
§78u(c) (1934) and § 18(d), 49 STAT. 831 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. §79r(d) (Supp.
1937).
68. § 11(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 456 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A.
§ 161(2) (Supp. 1937).
69. § 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 723 (1914), 15 U. S. C.
§ 50 (1934) ; see note 67, supra.
70. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924).
71. This distinction is couched by Freund in terms of enabling and directing powers.
FREuND, op. cit. supra note 12, at 59-64.
72. Id., at §§ 49, 55, 146, 155. See Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States,
277 U. S. 551, 559 (1928); Smith v. Foster, 15 F. (2d) 115, 117 (S. D. N. Y. 1926).
73. See Interstate Comm. Comm. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 227 U. S. 88, 91 (1913) ;
Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 264 (1924); Feller, op. cit. supra note 9, at
659 et seq. For a suggestion that a denial of a license may infringe upon the appli-
cant's property rights in the form of his right to work, see Dicxixsox, op. cit. .spra
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Because of the vagueness of these concepts, the statutes setting up the ad-
ministrative agencies may sometimes exercise considerable influence. Thus,
if the statute omits mention of a hearing, or grants one only at the option of
the administrative body, courts may be reluctant to allow an appeal, because
to do so might at the same time necessitate a declaration that the statute is
void for failure to guarantee a hearing3 4 And the chances of evading the
requirement of a hearing will be enhanced if the agency's licensing power is
to be exercised according to "its discretion" or "its judgment,;' 7 and if that
discretion is to be employed without reference to any standard, or with refer-
ence to a general standard-such as the public interest-which does not
submit to evidentiary determination.Y6
Even these equivocal statements convey an erroneous impression of cer-
tainty, for these flexible doctrines have been refracted through the diverse
remedial processes of the 48 states,17 and the result has been a confusion
clearly unparalleled by any of the other doctrines governing appealability.
But while the doctrine has already become distended in its impact on the
orders of state licensing boards, it is still in an amorphous stage of develop-
ment in its relation to the licensing orders of the federal administrative
agencies. The explanation of this contrast is probably the vastly wider range
of state licensing activities and the comparatively recent employment of the
licensing power to implement the activities of the federal regulatory agencies.78
With the increasing resort to the licensing power by federal agencies, am-
plification of the "pure discretion" doctrine may be anticipated.
The issue was squarely raised for the first time in a recent case involving
the confidential information provisions of the Securities and Exchange AcL70
Section 12(b) of the Act requires a corporation whose securities are sold
on national exchanges to file a report containing certain information con-
note 33, at 256, n. 7. Where revocation of an existing license is involved, there is a
stronger argument in terms of property rights. See (1926) 24 Mien. L. REv. 846.
74. See Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U. S. 110 (1922). Where no hearing is provided
for, the court may imply such a provision in order to preserve the statute's constitu-
tionality. Comment (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 96, 99.
75. FuxwuN, op. cit. supra note 12, at §§ 55, 137. Cf. Lacy v. Selectmen of Win-
chendon, 240 Mass. 118, 133 N. E. 90 (1921) (removal of public officer without notice
and hearing). But cf. Magill, Finality of Determinations of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue II (1930) 30 CoL L. Rnv. 147, 158 et seq.
76. Id., at § 34. But cf. Tollefson, Judicial Revew of the Decisions of' the Federal
Trade Commission (1927) 4 Wis. L. Rxv. 257, 272 et seq. Questions may arise whether
such grants of discretion are not improper delegations of legislative power. See (1928)
54 A. L. R. 1104; (1934) 92 A. L P. 400.
77. For a study of remedies against administrative action in New York, see Com-
ment (1933) 33 Co.. L. Rnv. 105. This study indicates the uncertainty and local peculi-
arities of the doctrines now under discussion. Id., at 110 et seq.
78: See, in general, Koons, Growth of Federal Licensing (1936) 24 Gao. L. J. 293.
79. American Sumatra Tobacco Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm., 93 F. (2d)
236 (App. D. C. 1937).
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cerning its corporate structure.8 0 Under Section 24(b) the corporation
may file written objection to the public disclosure of any information, and
"the Commission is authorized to hear objections in any such case where
it deems it advisable." The Commission "may . . .make available to the
public the information . . .only when in its judgment a disclosure of
such information is in the public interest."8 1 After holding a hearing, the
Commission refused to grant the request of the American Sumatra Tobacco
Company for confidential treatment. When the company attempted to
appeal, the Commission contended that only orders which must be preceded
by notice and hearing are appealable, and that since no hearing was
required, no appeal could be taken.8 2 The court, however, declared that
"property rights" such as were here involved could not be destroyed without
notice and hearing,8 3 and that it would construe Section 12 as merely author-
izing the Commission to dispense with a hearing when confidential treatment
was granted.
While the decision does not determine whether appeals can be taken when
notice and hearing are not necessary, it helps to indicate when licensing orders
must be preceded by hearing. There is some doubt, however, that the decision
will be sustained, for there have been holdings that hearing and appeal need
not be provided when, as here, a statute makes a special exception from a
general requirement 4 or when the permission may be classified as a priv-
ilege.
85
Even if the court had held that no hearing were necessary, it is by no means
clear that the order would be immune from attack. Indeed, the commission
merely contended that the provision for statutory appeals was applicable only
to orders issued after hearing;86 it expressly conceded that a general equity
80. 48 STAT. 892, 15 U. S. C. §781(b) (1934).
81. 48 STAT. 901, 15 U. S. C. § 78x(b) (1934) (italics supplied). This is not
strictly a licensing provision, but is virtually equivalent to one, in that it provides in
essence for the grant or denial of permission to withhold information from the public.
82. Congress specifically rejected a provision for a hearing in this section. See
Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 790, 796, n. 46.
83. See Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 790, 796.
84. Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551 (1928); Baltimore
& 0. Ry. v. Lambert Run Coal Co., 267 Fed. 776 (1920), aff'd on other grounds,
258 U. S. 377 (1922) ; cf. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503 (1902).
85. See Comment, (1934) 34 COL. L. Rzv. 332, 339, n. 47, and cases cited. On the
necessity of notice and hearing in administrative proceedings in general, see, also,
Comment (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 96.
86. The statute provides that appeals may be taken from an order "issued by the
Commission in a proceeding . . . to which such person is a party," that a transcript
of the record of such proceeding be certified, and that "findings of fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be final." 48 STAT. 901, 15 U.S. C. A. § 78y(a) (1934).
The commission's argument was that the wording of the provision indicated that the
only decisions appealable thereunder were those which had to be preceded by a hear-
ing so that its findings would be supported by evidence contained in a record. But see
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injunction could be secured to prevent the publication of the information.87
But it is doubtful whether the commission's contention can be maintained.
Since a decision that no hearing was necessary would indicate that no sub-
stantial property rights were affected, it might be difficult to show irreparable
injury for the purposes of securing equity jurisdiction.8 s This objection
might be avoided in the more typical license cases, where the legal remedy of
mandamus is usually invoked. But though administrative action could be
contested in this manner, it would rarely be overturned, because of the doc-
trinal difficulty that mandamus will not lie to coerce administrative discretion
to reach a particular decision.89
When a license is granted, property rights are not impinged upon so
directly as when one is denied; grants of permission are therefore more hlkely
to be held exercises of "pure discretion" than are denials. Thus, though the
court in the Sumatra case felt constrained to find that the statute guaranteed
a hearing when confidential treatment was refused, it conceded without hesi-
tancy that the Commission might dispense with hearings when confidential
treatment was granted.90
While the problem of whether an attack may be made on a grant of a
privilege has normally not been posed in terms of "pure discretion," similar
results are reached by resort to the doctrine that only interested and affected
parties may appeal. In statutory injunction suits this doctrine finds its source
in the general equity principle of irreparable injury,01 in statutory appeals.
American Sumatra Tobacco Co. v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 93 F. (2d) 236,
241. (App. D. C. 1937). The provision had previously been interpreted to contemplate
a proceeding hiter partes, i.e., a hearing between the Commission and the registrant,
rather than an investigation. Third Ave. Ry. v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 85 F.
(2d) 914 (C.C.A. 2d, 1936).
87. American Sumatra Tobacco Co. v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 93 F. (2d)
236, 241 (App. D. C. 1937). Cf. Interstate Comm. Comm. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 216
U.S. 538 (1910). The Commission further claimed that the appellant could also have
obtained a review by refusing to include the information under dispute with its appli-
cation for registration, so that the Commission would be forced to proceed against it
under § 19 (a) (2) and thereafter issue a formal order suspending registration. 48 STAT.
898, 15 U. S. C. §78s(a)(2) (1934).
88. The equity courts have shown great liberality in finding property rights, however,
when the plaintiffs case is a strong one on the merits. See Lockwood, Maw, and Rosen-
berry, The Use of the Federal Injunction it Constitutional Litigation (1930) 43 HAnv.
L. REv. 426, 429, n. 14 and cases cited; cf. Dxc Txso, op. cit. supra note 33, at 256, n. 7.
89. Mandamus will lie only to compel the performance of a "mrinisterial" act, an act
over which the administrative body has no discretion. See Comment (1933) 33 CoL.
L. REv. 105, 117-120. But even discretion may be coerced when the commission has
acted arbitrarily. Id., at 119.
90. American Sumatra Tobacco Co. v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 93 F. (2d)
236, 239 (App. D. C. 1937).
91. F. H. Peavey & Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 176 Fed. 409, 417 (C. C. NV. D. Mo.
1910), aff'd and language adopted in Interstate Comm. Comm. v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S.
42, 49 (1911).
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the statutes themselves generally provide that appeals may be maintained
only by "aggrieved" parties.0
2
As in the case of a denial of a license, the provisions for notice and the
conduct of a hearing may be influential in determining sufficiency of interest.
Thus, if the statute requires that notice of an application for a permission
be sent to specified parties, a persuasive argument can be made that the right
to notice implies the right to appeal.Y3 On the other hand, the customary
provisions for a hearing are couched in general terms, and cannot be deemed
to confer on any one a right to appeal. But the actual conduct of the hearing
may be of importance, for one who does not take part in a hearing may find
it difficult to assert that his interest is sufficient to entitle him to appeal. Thus
by specific statutory provision the decisions of the Securities and Exchange
Commission are appealable only by those who have attained the status of
parties before the Commission. 94 Similarly, before an appeal may be taken
from a decision of the Communications Commission, some effort at least
must have been made to participate in the administrative hearing.05 On the
other hand, under the statutory injunction procedure, an appeal may be
maintained even though the appellant did not take part in the hearings. 0
While failure to appear at the hearing may be fatal, participation does not
of itself bestow the right to appeal, for an administrative hearing is said to
be more in the nature of an investigation than of a trial.9T Thus, though the
Supreme Court said in the Chicago Junction case"8 that the very granting
of intervention to the complainants by the Interstate Commerce Commission
indicated that they had sufficient interest to challenge the order involved, 0
the commission's practice of allowing' liberal intervention'0" has made it
92. See, e.g., statutes cited in notes 5 and 6, supra.
93. FREUND, op. cit. mipra note 12, § 55. See Miller v. United States, 277 Fed. 95
(S. D. N. Y. 1921), discussed in note 107, infra.
94. See note 86, supra.
95. BmRy, COMMUNICATIONS BY WIRE AND RADIO (1937) 213-214; cf. Sykes v.
Jenny Wren Co., 78 F. (2d) 729 (App. D. C. 1935); Comment (1936) 49 H v. L.
Rsv. 1333, 1342.
96. See Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 268, 269, n. 12 (1924) and cases
cited therein. Cf. Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F.
(2d) 788 (App. D. C. 1937).
97. See, In re Deseret Mortuary Co., 78 Utah 393, 400, 3 P. (2d) 267, 270 (1931);
cf. People ex rel. N. Y. Edison Co. v. Willcox, 207 N. Y. 86, 109, 100 N. E. 705, 712
(1912) (Cullen, C. J., dissenting).
98. 264 U. S. 258 (1924).
99. "The intervention must be preceded by an order of the Commission granting
leave; and leave can be granted only to one showing interest. No case has been found
in which either this Court, or any lower court, has denied to one who was a party to
the proceedings before the Commission the right to challenge the order entered therein."
Id., at 268. The court emphasized the distinction between parties who are allowed to
intervene and those who are allowed to be heard. Id., at 268, n. 11; see McLean Lumber
Co. v. United States, 237 Fed. 460, 467-468 (E. D. Tenn. 1916).
100. Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 268, n. 11 (1924).
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necessary to require an independent showing of interest.10' And even when
a party petitioned the Radio Commission for a rehearing on a grant of a
license, it was indicated that he did not automatically obtain the right to
appeal from an affirmance of the grant.'0 2
Since participation in the hearing normally does not determine the right
of appeal, most of the cases have been decided in terms of sufficiency of in-
terest. Attempts to prosecute appeals from grants of permission have been
made by two broad classes of persons: competitors of the licensee and repre-
sentatives of the public. Generally a competitor cannot maintain an appeal
simply by showing that he will be injured by the incidence of increased com-
petition.10 3 He must go further and show that the order has deprived him
of a chance to compete on an equal basis with the licensee, or that it has
otherwise interfered with his operations. Thus, in the Chicago Junction
case, an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission permitting a single
carrier to obtain control of certain terminal railroads that had been used
impartially by all carriers entering Chicago was held to involve an injury
to the competing lines which was more than a mere increase in competition.1 0°
But an order of a state securities commission allowing the registration of
certain certificates does not deprive the registrant's competitors of any rights;
hence they cannot appeal as parties aggrieved thereby.10 5 A similar holding
with respect to decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission may
be anticipated. When the Communications Commission grants a license to
a radio station, a competitor may appeal as a party aggrieved if substantial
interference in the broadcasting channel of his already established station may
result, or if his present application for a license to set up a station of his
own is thereby foreclosed; but prior informal inquiry as to the possibility
of obtaining a license or a mere expectancy of applying for one in the future
does not make him sufficiently interested. 00
101. Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U. S. 249 (1930) ; Pennsylvania
R.R. v. United States, 40 F. (2d) 921 (NV. D. Pa. 1930).
102. Telegraph Herald Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 66 F. (2d) 220 (App. D. C.
1933); cf. Universal Service Wireless, Inc. v. Federal Radio Comm., 41 F. (2d) 113
(App. D. C. 1930).
103. Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 40 F. (2d) 921 (V. D. Pa. 1930); see
Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 271 (1924) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) ; cf. Note
(1937) 109 A. I- R. 1259. But cf. Groner, J., dissenting in Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co.,
78 F. (2d) 729, 734 (App. D. C. 1935). See Comment (1933) 33 CoL L. RE,. 105,
106, n. 4, for New York cases where competitors of the successful applicant for admin-
istrative permission were held to have enough of an interest to maintain an appeal.
See also N. Y. INsuRANcE LAw (1925) §§ 91(6), § 143(13) for provisions expressly
granting the right to all other certificate-holders to appeal from a decision of the com-
missioner of insurance granting a certificate of authority.
104. See note 99, mpra, for a further ground for this decision.
105. In re Deseret Mortuary Co., 78 Utah 393, 3 P. (2d) 267 (1931) ; but cf. Clarks-
burg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co. v. Woodring, S9 F. (2d) 788 (App. D. C.
1937).
106. Journal Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 48 F. (2d) 461 (App. D. C. 1931);
Telegraph Herald Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 66 F. (2d) 220 (App. D. C. 1933);
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Among those who may seek to champion the interests of the public are
the stockholders of the applicant company who oppose the authorized ex-
tension of the company's facilities, 10 7 officials of the states in which the
company operates, 10 8 the consumers upon whom the authorized actions may
have a direct effect,' 0 9 or organizations which represent the general public.'"
Since the administrative body itself is generally regarded as the guardian of
the public interest, such appellants must show some actual invasion of their
independent legal rights."' In In re Deseret Mortuary Company,n 2 for
example, the Utah Supreme Court held that the alleged desire of the Chamber
of Commerce to keep unworthy securities from being placed before the public
was insufficient to allow it to appeal as a "person aggrieved" by an admin-
istrative decision allowing the registration of a company's securities."n
WGN v. Federal Radio Comm., 68 F. (2d) 432 (App. D. C. 1933); cf. Pulitzer Pub-
lishing Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 94 F. (2d) 249 (App. D. C. 1937); see
Comment (1936) 49 I-ARV. L. REv. 1333, 1341.
107. See Venner v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 271 U. S. 127 (1926). The language indi-
cates vaguely that a minority stockholder might have successfully challenged an I. C. C.
order permitting the issuance of new securities by the carrier corporation had he chosen
the right forum. But in Miller v. United States, 277 Fed. 95 (S. D. N. Y. 1921), it
was indicated that only the authorities of the states through which the carrier passes
can enjoin such a permissive order. The statute specifically provides for notice to
such officials. See also (1937) 47 YAIz L. J. 289, 292, n. 19.
108. Texas v. Eastern Tex. R.R., 258 U. S. 204 (1922) ; Colorado v. United States,
271 U. S. 153 (1926); see Miller v. United States, 277 Fed. 95, 97 (S. D. N. Y. 1921).
109. Cf. Home Furniture Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 456 (1926); McLean Lum-
ber Co. v. United States, 237 Fed. 460 (E. D. Tenn. 1916) (shipper attacking a rate
order). Two hundred railroads have recently filed a petition in the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals to review orders of the Bituminous Coal Commission fixing mini-
mum prices for coal. They complain as parties aggrieved insofar as the orders affect
the price of locomotive fuel. This is among the first cases to come up on appeal from
the decisions of this commission. (1938) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 624. A stay of these price
orders has been granted pending determination of the suits. (1938) 5 U. S. L WEns,
673. Cf. Blackman v. Mellon, Sec'y of Treasury, 5 F (2d) 987 (E. D. . Y. 1924).
110. F. H. Peavey & Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 176 Fed. 409 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1910),
aff'd sub. nom. Interstate Comm. Comm. v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42 (1911); see Chi-
cago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 271 (1924) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) ; FRnuND, op.
cit. supra note 12, at 167.
111. United States v. Merchants and Manufacturers Traffic Ass'n, 242 U. S. 178
(1916); Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, 263 U. S. 143 (1923);
Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U. S. 249 (1930); Pulitzer Publishing
Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 94 F. (2d) 249 (App. D. C. 1937). In the
case of the awarding of government contracts to the lowest responsible bidder, taxpayers
have been allowed to challenge by mandamus the contracting board's award. See (1938)
47 YAI L. J. 833, n. 10.
112. 78 Utah 393, 3 P. (2d) 267 (1931).
113. The court indicated also that, when registration is denied, the only persons
interested for the sake of appeal are those who have given notice that they intend to
sell the securities, i.e., those who are interested as issuers, dealers, or salesmen thereof.
Id. at 400, 3 P. (2d) at 269.
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
"Directing" Orders. While an order that a certain practice be discontinued
is quasi-judicial and appealable, it is by no means clear that an appeal may
be taken from a refusal to institute proceedings or from a refusal to issue
such an order."14 Appeals of this type are governed by doctrines similar to
those applied to orders granting licenses, for a refusal to take action is some-
what in the nature of a "purely discretionary act." And since the administra-
tive agency itself is often regarded as the guardian of the public interest,
there may be a reluctance to allow appeals by private partiesPn 5
The right to prosecute an appeal, then, may depend on the incidence of
a refusal to issue an order on private rights. Sometimes the statutory pro-
visions for appeal may help to indicate whether the proceeding is essentially
public or private. Thus a competitor or a consumer probably cannot appeal
from a refusal of the Federal Trade Commission to issue a cease and desist
order,"x6 for the proceedings are regarded as being conducted principally in
the public interest.117 On the other hand, while proceedings under the National
Labor Relations Act are also tinged with a strong public interest, 18 the union
which prefers charges has a vital interest,"10 and the National Labor Relations
114. See Fanux, op. cit. supra note 12, § 149. Cf. People ex rel. Weatherwa= v.
Watt, 115 Misc. 120, 188 N. Y. Supp. 559 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. 1921), aff'd, 197 App.
Div. 929 (3d Dep't 1921) (mandamus issued at instance of representative of the public
to compel mayor to enforce a law prohibiting the operation of buses without a license).
115. Cf. cases cited in note 111, supra.
116. The appeal provisions mention only cease and desist orders; appeals from re-
fusals to order are therefore probably precluded. 38 STAT. 720 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 45
(1934), Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Comm., 280 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 8th,
1922) ; see note 41, supra. Moreover, only the party who is required to cease and
desist by the commission's order can appeal from it under the statute. Wholesale
Grocers' Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm., 277 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 5th 1922).
117. See HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE CODUISS101 (1924) 49; FnMuND, op. dt.
mLipra note 12, at 168. For similar reasons mandamus would probably not lie to com-
pel the commission to hold a hearing on an alleged unfair trade practice even though
its refusal to institute proceedings were based on an erroneous belief that it was without
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the language of the act is so phrased as to leave it clearly
to the commission's discretion to prosecute or not, and it is said that mandamus cannot
be used to coerce administrative discretion. Id., at 139. See note 89, supra. But, while
decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission refusing to entertain proceedings are
also not subject to statutory review, mandamus will lie to force the commission to
do so when its refusal is the result of error in respect to its jurisdiction. See cases
cited in note 147, infra. Those cases, however, are more like two-party suits in which
the commission acts solely as judge, while individual complainants have no such control
over the prosecution of cases before the Federal Trade Commission.
118. Cf. Comment (1936) 22 WAsH. U. L Q. REv. 81, 88, n. 32; Comment (1935)
35 Cor. L. Rav. 1098, 1112, n. 100.
119. The board has thus far acted only in response to petitions for investigation and
certification of representatives filed by employees. See Comment (1938) 32 Iu.. I.
Ray. 568, 597.
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Act specifically provides that an appeal may be taken from a "final order of
the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought."
120
Negative Orders. Appeals from a diverse group of orders are precluded
by the unique doctrine known as the negative order rule. This doctrine
has been applied almost exclusively to decisions of the Interstate Commerce
Commission and is apparently confined to agencies whose decisions are sub-
ject to a similar type of review.121 In the leading case of Proctor and Gamble
Company v. United States1 22 it was held that, where a shipper had complained
to the commission as to the reasonableness of certain charges and had been
denied relief after a hearing, he might not thereafter petition the Commerce
Court to set aside the commission's "negative" order and to enjoin future
collection of these charges. The first basis for distinguishing such an order,
according to the court, was that the express language of the Act gave the
Commerce Court jurisdiction over suits brought for the enforcement of the
commission's orders and over those brought to enjoin or annul such orders.
123
The juxtaposition of the enforcement provision and the injunction provision
was seized upon as indicating that only orders which require enforcement are
subject to review. 124 This interpretation of the statute has at most a purposive
plausibility ;125 and, in the Chicago Junction case, it was held that orders
which grant a privilege may be enjoined or set aside, even though they also
need no further enforcement.126 The court further said that the real basis
of the negative order doctrine was the second ground of the decision in the
Proctor and Gamble case: the desire to carry out the Act's policy of placing
120. 49 STAT. 455 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(f) (Supp. 1937). Cf. Joel v. Rosseter,
15 F. Supp. 914, 915 (N. D. Cal. 1936).
121. The decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission are subject to the review
procedure provided by the Urgent Deficiencies Act. See note 3, supra. United States
v. Corrick, 298 U. S. 435 (1936) (decision of the Secretary of Agriculture under the
Packers and Stockyards Act); Inghram v. Union Stock. Yards Co., 5 F. Supp. 486
(D. Neb. 1933) (same); see American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 14 F. Supp.
121, 127 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) (Federal Communications Commission); Comment (1934)
34 COL. L. Rzv. 908, 916. The agencies whose decisions are subject to the identical
review procedure are collected in United States v. Griffin, 58 Sup. Ct. 601, at 606
(1938).
122. 225 U. S. 282 (1912).
123. ComEzacE COURT AcT, c. 309, §§ 1 and 2, 36 STAT. 539 (1910). The Commerce
Court's jurisdiction as expressed in these provisions was later transferred to the district
courts. See note 3, supra.
124. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282, 293 (1912) ; see 2 SnIAm'-
MAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1931) 406 et seq.
125. See Comment (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 908, 909.
126. 264 U. S. 258 (1924). See Brooklyn East. Dist. Terminal v. United States,
28 F. (2d) 634, 636 (S. D. N. Y. 1927). The problem in connection with this type
of order is to decide what party has sufficient interest to attack them. See p. 781 ct seq.,




the resolution of technical problems in expert hands.1a7 But it is difficult to
see how it would constitute more of a usurpation of administrative discretion
for the courts to review this type of decision than one involving affirmative
action. And in any case administrative discretion could better be preserved
inviolate by a more scrupulous limitation of the scope of review than by such
haphazard restrictions on appealability.
Possibly because of the inadequacy of the conventional explanation for the
negative order doctrine, the Supreme Court has recently advanced another
justification. The review" procedure provided by the Commerce Court Act
and its successor, the Urgent Deficiences Act, is peculiar in that the original
hearing is before a three-judge court, an appeal lies directly to the Supreme
Court, and priority is accorded both in the trial court and on appeal. In
United States v. Griffin12 8 these peculiarities were held to indicate that the
orders appealable in that manner were those whose importance and effect
were so widespread that it was desirable to "guard against ill-considered
action by a single judge" and yet "avert the delays ordinarily incident to
litigation." The Supreme Court seemed to feel that, since negative orders are
refusals to change the existing status, they are not sufficiently important to
be thus appealable. 12 9 But the use of the affirmative or negative test as the
criterion for determining what orders are of wide public interest seems only
slightly related to the facts.
It is doubtful whether the negative order doctrine can be explained satis-
factorily on the basis of the type of action to which it has been held to apply
- or on any other basis - for it has been extended to cover a wide gamut of
situations. Thus it has been applied where the commission denied a shipper's
application for reduction in rates,1'0 where the commission declined to in-
crease a carrier's allowance for railway mail compensation,1'1 where the com-
mission failed or refused to fix divisions in joint rates, as requested by a
carrier, 32 and where the commission refused to grant a carrier a certificate
127. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282, 294 et seq. See Board
of R.R. Comm'rs v. Great No. Ry., 281 U. S. 412, 421-422.
128. 58 Sup. Ct. 601 (1938).
129. Id., at 604-605. The court also relied upon the first ground for the Proctor
& Gamble decision to justify the negative order rule. See note 124, mspra. The order
under attack was a refusal to increase the compensation to be paid to a railroad by
the government for carrying the mail, and the court indicated that even an affirmative
order involving such a problem would not have the requisite public importance to be
subject to review by statutory injunction. Other orders which the court indicated vere
lacking in the necessary public interest were those determining the amount due to a
railroad on the government's guaranty of income for the period following the relin-
quishment of federal control, and valuation orders under the Valuation Act. See notes
21 and 22, supra.
130. Hooker v. Knapp, 225 U. S. 302 (1912).
131. United States v. Griffin, 58 Sup. Ct 601 (1938). See note 129, mspra.
132. Manufacturers Ry. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457, 483 (1918). Accord:
Lehigh Valley MR. v. United States, 243 U. S. 412 (1917). This has been analogized
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of public convenience and necessity to extend its lines.' 33 Resort has been
had to the negative order doctrine most frequently in cases where shippers
have applied to the commission for an award of reparation from a carrier,
1 3 4
but an alternative ground for these decisions has been indicated. In Standard
Oil Company v. United States'35 the Supreme Court pointed out that in
reparation suits such as that in issue, the shipper has a choice of resort to
the courts or to the commission, 136 and therefore, when denied relief by the
latter, he may be precluded from suing in the courts under the election of
remedies doctrine. This rationale does not fit all reparation suits, for when-
ever a rate, rule or practice is attacked as unreasonable or unjustly discrim-
inatory, and the exercise of administrative judgment upon an intricate fact
situation is required, the shipper has no choice; he must make primary resort
to the commission.'
3 7
The explanation of these decisions may be a desire of the courts to relieve
themselves of a severe burden, for there are a large number of such suits
by shippers,'33 and there has been a tendency toward the development of a
"reparation racket."'I3 9 But while this policy is probably justifiable, it results
in granting the right of appeal to one side alone in an action that is essen-
tially similar to a two-party suit in the courts.
The uncertain doctrinal base of the negative order rule is reflected in
judicial attempts to determine whether particular orders fit within the nega-
tive order category. The courts have developed the doctrine that orders
negative in form are subject to review by statutory injunction if they are
affirmative in substance. In the Intermountain Rate cases, 1 40 the Supreme
Court interpreted the Interstate Commerce Act as giving to carriers the
positive right to petition the commission for relief from the long and short
haul clause, so that refusal to grant relief is not negative but affirmative
"since it refuses that which the statute in affirmative terms declares shall be
granted if only the conditions which the statute provides are found to
to a legislature's failure to pass a statute as justification for the refusal to exert judicial
compulsion upon it. See Comment (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 908, 911.
133. Piedmont & No. Ry. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469 (1930); cf. Pittsburgh
& W. Va. Ry. v. Interstate Comm. Comm., 293 F. 1001 (App. D. C. 1923) ; see Alton
R.R. v. United States, 287 U. S. 229, 238, n. 6 (1932).
134. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 235 (1931) ; Southern Transporta-
tion Co. v. Interstate Comm. Comm., 47 F. (2d) 411 (App. D. C. 1931), cert. denied,
283 U. S. 850 (1931).
135. 283 U. S. 235 (1931).
136. The Interstate Commerce Act expressly gives him such a choice. 24 STrT.
382 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 9 (1934).
137. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426 (1907); Miller,
loc. cit. supra note 47.
138. INTERsTATE COMMERCE COMMIssIoN, 45TH ANNUAL REPORT (1931) 93-94.
139. See Miller, op. cit. mipra note 47, at 79, n. 129.
140. 234 U. S. 476 (1914).
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exist."1 41 Again, where the commission dismissed a carrier's petition attack-
ing divisions of joint rates voluntarily enforced by a group of carriers, the
court held that the dismissal really constituted an affirmative order that those
divisions be continued in force and was therefore enjoinable.24 Since this
argument could have been made with equal force in the Proctor and Gamble
case,143 the negative order doctrine seems to have been freely manipulated
by the courts in taking or refusing jurisdiction over statutory injunction suits.
Even when an order is concededly negative, there is a possibility that
review may be obtained by methods other than the statutory injunction. But
whenever the issue has been squarely raised, the negative order doctrine has
been extended to preclude resort to other remedies. 114 The reasons given
for such holdings ;ire that the statute limits the court's jurisdiction to "aflirma-
live" orders 45 and that mandamus, certiorari, or mandatory injunction will
not lie to coerce administrative discretion or to act as a substitute for writ
of error or appeal.140 Despite the strong language of the courts, the possi-
bility still remains that a decision of the commission which exceeds the bounds
of "mere error" may be subjected to some one of these e.xtraordinary methods
of review; for mandamus has been granted to compel the commission to
hold a hearing on the merits of a case when it has erroneously decided that
it has no jurisdiction.147 And there have been other indications that the
141. Id., at 490. Contra: Louisville & N. Ry. v. United States, 207 Fed. 591 (Com.
Ct. 1913) ; cI. Lehigh Valley R.R. v. United States, 243 U. S. 412 (1917).
142. Alton R.R. v. United States, 287 U. S. 229 (1932), (1932) 1 GEo. WAsn. L.
R-v. 276. Accord: United States v. New River Co., 265 U. S. 533 (1924); Norfolk
& W. Ry. v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 967 (IV. D. Va. 1931); Cheapeake & 0. Ry.
v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 7 (E. D. Va. 1933).
143. In that case, the charges that were being attacked were in accordance with a
set of rules drawn up by a committee of the National Association of Railroad Com-
missioners and approved by the Commission, though their enforcement was not im-
peratively prescribed by that body. Thus, the dismissal of the complaint might have
been held to be an affirmative order that the complainant continue to pay the charges
in question. Similar arguments could be made in most of the negative order cases.
144. See Comment (1934) 34 Cor. L. REv. 908, 915.
145. Southern Transp. Co. v. Interstate Comm. Comm., 47 F. (2d) 411 (App. D. C.
1931) (general equity injunction).
146. Interstate Comm. Comm. v. United States ex. rel. Campbell, 289 U. S. 385
(1933) (mandamus); Southern Transp. Co. v. Interstate Comm. Comm., 61 F. (2d)
925 (App. D. C. 1932) (certiorari). Cf. United States ex. rel. Del. & H. R v.
Interstate Comm. Comm., 51 F. (2d) 429 (App. D. C. 1931).
147. Interstate Comm. Comm. v. United States ex. reL. Humboldt Steamship Co.,
224 U. S. 474 (1912); United States ex. rte. Louisville Cement Co. v. Interstate Comm.
Comm., 246 U. S. 638 (1918). Orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission issued
pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act are expressly made subject to the sme type of
review as its orders regulating commerce, with the interesting exception that the statute
provides for the issuance of a mandatory injunction on the petition of an interested
party when the Commission issues a negative order solely because of a supposed lack
of power. 49 STAT. 550 (1935), 49 U.S.C.A. §305(h) (Supp. 1937).
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